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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in actual need regardless of his expectation or opinion.' In a similar
case it was held that a widow was limited to what was requisite for
her comfortable maintenance and support, and that so long as she
acted, reasonably and in good faith, the amount to be appropriated
from the principal must be left to her own discretion, but if wasteful
or unreasonable, she might be restrained by a court of equity upon
the complaint of any of the remaindermen.2 Subsequently in a case
in which the widow had the use and income of the property for life
with the privilege of expending "so much of the principal as she
may find necessary for her comfortable maintenance and support,"
the Court held that the widow was the sole judge of what was neces-
sary, and so long as she exercised her opinion in that respect in good
faith, she could not be questioned by a remainderman or by a court;
for mere extravagance or wastefulness in expenditure of principal
for her own support did not amount to bad faith.3 The Court recog-
nized as law, the principle laid down in the prior cases, but thought
that the attendant circumstances in the case before them created a
distinction. No such circumstances were present in this case to
necessitate such a departure.
B. E. D.
INHIERITANcE-TRANSFER TAX-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CON-
FLicTs.-Plaintiff's testator, a resident of New York, died August 4,
1927. Included in his ' estate was a certificate of stock of the de-
fendant, a domestic corporation which is also incorporated under the
laws of Pennsylvania and other states. Plaintiff presented the cer-
tificate to the defendant at a transfer office in New York and re-
quested that it be transferred on the corporate books. Defendant
believing the certificate to be subject to the payment of a tax under
the laws of Pennsylvania, declined to make the transfer without proof
of payment or waiver thereof by the Commonwealth. A declaratory
judgment was obtained by the plaintiff subjecting the defendant to a
duty to transfer the certificate without exacting proof of payment of
the tax or waiver thereof. Defendant appealed. Held, judgment
reversed. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
already declared that the Commonwealth should continue to exact
transfer taxes from estates of New York decedents who died between
July 1, 1925 and March 12, 1928, our reciprocity statute being of no
effect in that jurisdiction during the period specified, defendant was
justified in demanding proof of payment of the tax or waiver thereof.
City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. New York Central Co., 253 N. Y.
49 (1930).
'Hull v. Culver, 34 Conn. 403 (1867).
'Little v. Geer, 69 Conn. 411 (1897).
'Reed v. Reed, 80 Conn. 401 (1908).
TAX COMMENT
In an effort to avoid growing evils in the inheritance tax laws of
New York, the Legislature in 1925 enacted an article entitled 10A of
the Tax Law. Article 10, then on the statute books, was to govern
transfers of property of resident decedents. The new enactment pro-
vided for a method of taxing estates of non-resident decedents. New
York's reciprocity statute,1 providing for exemption from a transfer
tax where the state of the non-resident exempted our residents from
a transfer tax on property located in that state, was included as a
part of Article 10A. In 1927 other sections of Article 1OA providing
for various rates of taxation on estates of non-residents, were de-
clared unconstitutional in that they were in conflict with the limita-
tions of the Federal Constitution.2  The State Tax Commission was
promply advised that transfers were thereafter to be taxed under the
rates existing prior to the enactment of Article IOA. The Commis-
sion, interpreting this to mean that the reciprocity statute had fallen
with the other provisions of Article 10A, proceeded to collect transfer
taxes from non-resident decedents of all states. This in turn was
followed by the extinguishment of reciprocal provisions on the part
of Pennsylvania and other states. No court of this state had de-
clared that the reciprocity statute was no longer in force. It was an
assumption without judicial sanction. This condition existed until
1928 when the Legislature came to the rescue with a statute designed
to bridge the gap from July 1, 1925 to March 12, 1928.3 Provision
was made for a new reciprocity statute (without extinguishing the
old). Another section 4 provided that no refunds were to be made
for payments made during the three-year period (to those who had
made payment of taxes under the belief that the old reciprocity statute
had fallen with the other sections of Article 10A) unless a similar
proviso was enacted by the other state as to payments made by our
residents in that state. The old reciprocity statute still in effect, the
subsequent statute, operating retroactively to take away a right which
in law existed, was a denial of due process 5 and consequently of no
effect. At this juncture the Court conceded that everything thus far
considered was in accord with plaintiff's contention. A consideration
of one more factor was necessary. What was the law of Pennsyl-
vania with respect to reciprocity? That state had ceased to extend
the exemption privilege to our residents concurrently without similar
action with respect to its residents. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
Sec. 248, p.
' Smith v. Loughman, 245 N. Y. 486. 157 N. E. 753 (1927), certiorari
denied 275 U. S. 560 (1927).
'Laws of 1928, Ch. 330.
'Ibid. Sec. 11.
'Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 353 (1928);
Matter of Pell, 171 N. Y. 48, 63 N. E. 789 (1902) ; Matter of Lansing, 182
N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905) ; Matter of Pettit, 65 App. Div. 30, 72 N. Y.
Supp. 469 (1st Dept. 1901); Matter of Craig, 97 App. Div. 289, 89 N. Y.
Supp. 971 (2nd Dept. 1904).
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vania declared that since reciprocal relations were at an end, transfer
taxes were to be imposed on our residents, at least during the period
between July 1, 1925 and March 12, 1928.6 No statute was passed
in that jurisdiction allowing retroactive reciprocal exemptions or
refunds. Reciprocity having failed during this period, it was proper
for the defendant to insist on proof of payment of the tax or waiver
thereof. The fact that the Court in the instant case found that our
reciprocity statute had not been affected by the failure of other sec-
tions of the same article had no effect on its decision because of the
fact that the Court in Pennsylvania construing its laws had deter-
mined that so far as that state was concerned no reciprocal relations
existed. No question arose as to the legitimacy of a Pennsylvania
tax on stock held by a person domiciled in this state. It has been
held recently that debts are subject to a transfer tax at but one place,
the domicile of the creditor.7 To avoid multiple taxation, reciprocal
exemption statutes are contained on the statute books of thirty-
seven states.
A. K. B.
INHERITANcE-TRANSFER TAX-INTANGIBLES-DOMICILE OF
OwNF..-Henry R. Taylor, while domiciled and residing in New
York, died testate. Included in his estate were negotiable bonds and
certificates of indebtedness issued by the state of Minnesota and its
subdivisions. All passed under his will which was probated in New
York where his estate was administered and a tax exacted upon the
entire testamentary transfer. The state of Minnesota assessed an
inheritance tax upon that portion of the estate consisting of obliga-
tions arising in that state. Deceased's executor contested the validity
of the, latter imposition. From a decision of the Supreme Court of
Minnesota affirming the validity of the assessment, plaintiff appeals.
Held, that the right asserted by the state is in conflict with the Four-
teenth Amendment and that the bonds and certificates may be validly
taxed at but one place-the domicile of the owner at his death.
Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. State of Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204,
50 Sup. Ct. Rep. 98 (1930).
It does not appear that difficulty of any serious account was met
with in determining the right to impose taxes, whether direct or in-
direct, upon real property. The right to so tax was and is accorded
only to a state wherein the realty is situated. Perhaps the strongest
argument in support of the right lies in the universally recognized
characteristic of land-its immovability. No such right is time-
honored with respect to personalty. Under early common law it was
'Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Farmers Loan & Trust Company, etc.,
147 Atl. 71 (May, 1929).
Farmers Loan & Trust Company v. State of Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204,
50 Sup. Ct, Rep. 98 (1930). See infra below.
